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The post-Cold War transatlantic relations have 
been marked by something akin to the law of 
opposite effects. When the relationship is 
vibrant, Europe’s defence cooperation 
stagnates. When the relationship is in trouble, 
Europeans pull themselves together to 
advance their security and defence interests. 
During the Clinton presidency, Europeans 
comfortably outsourced military crisis 
management in the Balkans to Washington. 
In contrast, a major transatlantic rift over the 
Iraq war during the Bush administration 
triggered the adoption of the European 
Security Strategy and a bulk of EU military 
operations under the banner of the European 
Security and Defence Policy. EU-US relations 
were back on an even keel during the Obama 
era, the time when Europeans haphazardly 
reduced their defence budgets and lost a great 
share of their military capabilities.  
Enter Donald Trump. During the deepest 
crisis of confidence among transatlantic allies 
in decades, Europeans re-energized their 
defence integration with a set of new 
initiatives, such as permanent structured 
cooperation (PESCO) and the European 
Defence Fund (EDF). It is therefore 
somewhat logical and far from unexpected 
that when Joe Biden emerged as the winner of 
the 2020 US presidential elections, there is yet 
again a heightened risk that Europeans would 
fall back into a lazy, self-defeating mindset of 
dependency on the US military shield. 
Breaking this pattern of reverse effects and 
avoiding European complacency is crucial for 
a healthy transatlantic partnership, but it 
requires concerted efforts on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
 
DEBATING STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 
Galvanized by their opposition to President 
Trump, Europeans actively embraced the goal of 
strategic autonomy. In truth, this ambition had 
been articulated before Trump even took office, 
most explicitly in the 2016 EU Global Strategy. 
The Strategy, however, did not spell out an 
operational definition of the concept, which 
made EU strategic autonomy in security and 
defence a subject of controversy. France, the 
 
 





most enthusiastic advocate of a stronger and 
capable EU in world affairs, stressed the need for 
the bloc to build independent defence capabilities 
in order to be prepared for a scenario in which 
the US is not willing or able to guarantee 
European security. Reducing dependence on the 
US is a sensible response to the perceived 
unpredictability of Uncle Sam. Yet, this 
maximalist articulation of strategic autonomy 
exposed a fear – especially among the Baltic 
States – that ‘a hedge can become a wedge’,1 and 
produce an irreversible erosion of security ties 
with the US.  
 
Paris’s push for European strategic autonomy has 
thus far often been misinterpreted as a call for 
strategic transatlantic decoupling, even though 
President Emmanuel Macron made it clear that 
European defence cooperation should not be 
conceived as an alternative to NATO.2 When it 
comes to Germany, it frames strategic autonomy 
differently. For Berlin, what counts is an effort to 
strengthen the European pillar of NATO as a 
way to further anchor the US in Europe and to 
commit states on the Eastern flank to both the 
EU and NATO. ‘We must become more 
European in order to remain transatlantic’, as 
Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer 
summed it up.3   
 
Despite the widespread confusion about the 
meaning of strategic autonomy, one thing is clear 
– Europeans are in a broad agreement that they 
have to take more responsibilities for their own 
defence. The real issue is what Europe can bring 
to the table in terms of capabilities and 
willingness to use them. This includes traditional 
capability shortfalls, such as strategic airlift and 
air-to-air refueling, and the operational gaps 
related to new security challenges, be it missile 
defence, anti-drone capability or warding off 
hybrid threats. That said, development of defence 
capabilities cannot be an end in itself; therefore 
the ultimate question regarding European 
defence cooperation remains ‘what for?’. A 
recent survey conducted among defence officials 
and experts has revealed a balanced three way 
split among the preferences for acting worldwide, 
acting in crises around Europe or acting to 
protect the homeland.4 In this context, EU 
member states started to work on a ‘Strategic 
Compass’, a new political military document to 
be adopted in 2022 during the French EU 
Presidency. The document is a welcome initiative 
as it intends to refine and harmonize operational 
goals for EU security and defence policy based 
on a common understanding of security threats 
and challenges.  
 
A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN 
With his ‘America is back’ message, Joe Biden has 
naturally tempted both sides of the Atlantic to 
return to ‘business as usual’, in which America 
leads the world and Europe plays a supporting 
role. This wish is unlikely to come true. Trump 
has done considerable damage to the notion of 
US leadership, while China and Russia have 
chipped away at the liberal international order, 
increasing their global clout at Washington’s cost. 
Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods 
are in turmoil, and there is the strain of the UK’s 
exit from the EU. To make things worse, the 
coronavirus pandemic has had devastating effects 
on Western economies, pushing many countries 
to look inward and, as a consequence, pay lip 
service to security and defence. All these 
challenges bolster the case for stronger ties 
between America and Europe, but to remain 
relevant the transatlantic alliance needs to be 
reinvented, rather than simply reset. 
 
With respect to the US, the Biden presidency should 
avoid following in the footsteps of previous 
administrations’ schizophrenic approach to 
European defence: simultaneously complaining that 
Europeans don’t do enough and do too much. The 
 
 





US would be well-advised to embrace PESCO 
and explicitly endorse the goal of European 
strategic autonomy. This would send a powerful 
signal to sceptics within the EU that a less 
dependent and more self-reliant Europe is not 
incompatible with NATO, but rather is a 
precondition for a revitalized transatlantic 
alliance. Today, senior members of the US 
defence establishment prudently acknowledge 
that America cannot protect itself or all of its 
interests entirely without the help of others.5 US 
allies, Europe included, are a part of America’s 
calculus in terms of its geopolitical competition 
with China and Russia. It is therefore in the 
American interest to have more capable 
European armed forces supported by a more 
consolidated European industrial base, even 
though this may imply a certain loss of export 
markets for US defence companies. The new US 
approach should be guided by a principled belief 
that Europeans doing less presents a bigger 
danger than Europeans doing more.  
 
When it comes to Europe, the critical task is to 
continue building its strategic autonomy in 
security and defence in the absence of pressure 
and head-on rhetoric coming out of the White 
House. Rather than waiting for signals from 
Washington, Europeans should actively engage 
the Biden administration to discuss a new 
architecture of collective burden-sharing in which 
France, Germany and others take the lead in 
certain areas, while the US assumes a supporting 
role. The European Commission’s proposal for a 
structured EU-US Security and Defence 
Dialogue is a good start. 6 A more balanced and 
equal transatlantic alliance implies, at the very 
least, Europeans taking over the lion’s share of 
responsibilities related to conflict resolution and 
crisis management in Europe’s neighbourhood, 
including conventional defence and deterrence 
against Russia. Europeans need to be well-aware 
about the domestic limits on US global 
leadership, given that the majority of American 
voters wants to reduce the US military presence 
abroad and is opposed to surges in defence 
spending. 7 Indeed, the idea of ‘a foreign policy 
for the middle class’,8 recently introduced by 
Biden and his team, signals that the US will 
exercise its power on the world stage judiciously 
and selectively, and Europe might not be on its 
top priority list.  
 
To put such a rebalanced transatlantic 
partnership to the test, Europeans should take 
steps towards strategic autonomy in the five 
geographic areas of great significance for 
transatlantic security. 
 
The Baltic region is at the forefront of defence and 
deterrence efforts against Russia. NATO’s 
deployment of four battlegroups in the Baltic states 
and Poland has been a breakthrough decision, but 
questions remain as to how effective these small 
rotational forces can be in deterring Moscow. It is 
perhaps not so surprising that the Polish government 
is actively pushing for upgrading the rotating 4,500 
strong US armoured brigade on its soil to a permanent 
division-size military force. Europeans should step in 
and consider forward deployment of troops and 
equipment in the Baltic region on their own. 
Complementary to NATO efforts, boosting the 
conventional military presence (troops, battle tanks, 
armoured vehicles) of Europe on the Eastern flank 
would arguably be the most direct and effective 
demonstration of European defence solidarity. It is 
also likely to be welcomed in Washington as an active 
measure of transatlantic burden-sharing. The budget 
line for the European Deterrence Initiative, 
introduced by President Obama in 2014 following 
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, has seen a 30% decline 
since 2019, and it is not for granted that the Biden 











Black Sea. After the annexation of the Crimea, 
Russia has multiplied its military footprint in the 
region, including through the deployment of anti-ship 
and anti-air missiles. The shifted military balance in the 
Black Sea threatens to undermine freedom of 
navigation and opens the door for maritime blockade 
of Ukraine’s coastal areas, as evidenced by the military 
stand-off between Russian and Ukrainian navy ships 
in the Kerch Strait in November 2018. Despite 
pledges to step up their maritime presence in the 
Black Sea, Western allies are still falling behind. 9 Last 
year, for example, Germany has sent just one vessel 
into the area for a total of 10 days. To effectively deter 
Russia, allies need a regular year-round naval presence 
in the form of a Black Sea maritime patrol mission, in 
addition to ongoing air policing. France, Germany 
and the UK, three countries with significant interests 
in the region, can take a lead in assembling a 
multinational European naval force that together with 
a limited American and Canadian contribution would 
support Romania and other NATO littoral states and 
partners in training, exercising and capacity building at 
sea.  
 
Eastern neighbours. The EU should include 
institutionalized security cooperation in its bilateral 
relations with members of the Eastern Partnership, 
foremost Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The trio has 
frequently been targeted by the Kremlin’s coercive 
measures, with sizeable parts of their sovereign 
territories being occupied by Russian military. The EU 
should encourage these Eastern neighbours to 
participate in PESCO projects (to boost domestic 
defence industry) and in activities of the European 
Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats 
(to build capacity against cyber-attacks and 
disinformation). There is ample room for EU 
member states to fill when it comes to military 
training, joint exercises and contingency planning with 
Eastern neighbours (mostly undertaken by non-EU 
NATO states today). As European policy makers 
reflect on CSDP’s priorities while drafting the 
Strategic Compass, the question of how to resolve the 
so-called ‘protracted conflicts’ in the post-Soviet space 
should be back on the agenda, as requested by 11 EU 
member states. 10  Investing in the resilience of Eastern 
partners is a suitable opportunity for Europeans to 
make a case for reframing transatlantic burden-
sharing beyond a narrow focus on the 2% defence 
spending benchmark.  
 
North Africa. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring 
in 2011, it has become clear that the turmoil in Libya 
is not an American problem. Disengagement has 
been a preferred option of the Obama and Trump 
administrations and will likely remain a favoured 
policy choice under Biden. Europeans therefore need 
to take the lead in rallying the international community 
to stabilize Libya. EU member states should 
strengthen their support for the arms embargo by 
allocating more ships to Operation Irini. Moreover, it 
is important to capitalize on the window of 
opportunity for peace-building that has been opened 
after the warring parties reached a ceasefire deal last 
October. A CSDP mission focused on ceasefire 
monitoring, demilitarization and disarmament would 
strengthen ongoing UN peace efforts in the run-up to 
national elections in December 2021. For its part, the 
US can provide political and diplomatic support for 
Libya’s post-conflict stabilization in the UN Security 
Council, as well as employ its space assets to assist 
Europeans in implementing the arms embargo.  
 
Indo-Pacific. The competition with China will be the 
single most important foreign policy issue during the 
Biden presidency. Given the bipartisan consensus in 
Congress, Washington’s policy on China is expected 
to get tougher. While it is unlikely that Biden, in a 
Trumpian transactional manner, will make the US 
security guarantee in NATO conditional upon 
Europe’s alignment with Washington on China, it is 
clear that Europeans ‘will be strongly urged to step in 
line with American preferences’. 11 Yet, Europeans will 
not endorse every US policy choice; and neither 
should they, if the idea is to build a partnership of 
equals. But in the realm of security, where their 
 
 





interests overlap, Europe should demonstrate greater 
solidarity with the US. Capable European powers 
need to step up naval operations in the South and East 
China Seas and the Taiwan Strait to support freedom 
of navigation and to dissuade China from redrawing 
borders by military force. If Europe is serious about 
defending the international rules-based order, it 
cannot remain neutral or indifferent when confronted 
with a Crimean scenario in the Indo-Pacific. 
 
To accomplish a new transatlantic division of labour 
across all the five areas simultaneously will not be easy, 
and some steps may take longer than others, but none 
of them can be achieved without collective 
determination and a united front among Europeans. 
Regardless of who sits in the White House in four 
years from now, Europeans should seize the 
opportunity offered by a new pro-European 
American government to redefine Europe’s place in 
the transatlantic partnership. Shortly after Biden’s 
victory, the French and German Foreign Ministers 
rightly contended that the question now is not what the 
transatlantic relationship can do for Europe, but what 
Europe can do for the transatlantic partnership. 12  Now it 
is time to put words into action, build more capable 
and self-reliant Europe and break the law of opposite 
effects in the transatlantic relations. 
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